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Abstract 
 
 
Difference-in-differences with matching is a popular method in impact evaluation. Traditional 
impact evaluation methods including difference-in-differences with matching often deal with 
impact measurement of a single binary program. Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2001) extend the 
matching method to the case of multiple mutually exclusive programs. Frölich (2002) discusses 
different impact evaluation methods in the similar context. In reality, one can participate in several 
programs simultaneously and the programs may be overlapping. This paper discusses the method of 
difference-in-differences with matching in a general context of multiple overlapping programs. The 
method is applied to measure impacts of formal and informal credit in Vietnam using panel data 
from two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2002 and 2004.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Traditional literature on program impact evaluation often deals with a single binary program. 
Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2001) extend the matching method to the case of multiple mutually 
exclusive programs. Frölich (2002) discusses different impact evaluation methods in a context 
multiple mutually exclusive binary programs. However, in reality the programs can be overlapping. 
Some people can join several programs at the same time. For example, for evaluation of a micro-
credit program that is provided by a bank, the participants and non-participants in the program can 
receive credit from other sources such as private lenders, relatives and other credit institutions.  
difference-in-differences with matching is a popular method of program impact evaluation. 
Panel data become more available in both developed and developing countries. The method has two 
main advantages. Firstly, it allows for the selection of the program based on unobservable time-
invariant variables. In this sense, it is more robust than evaluation methods which are based on 
conditional independence assumption such as matching using single cross-section data. Secondly, 
difference-in-differences with matching can be regarded a nonparametric method, which avoid the 
functional form assumptions invoked by parametric methods.  
This paper discusses the difference-in-differences with matching method in a general 
context in which subjects can participate in several programs simultaneously. The method is 
illustrated by measuring impacts of formal and informal credit in Vietnam. The panel data used for 
the impact estimate are from two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2002 and 2004.  
 The paper is organized into six sections as follows. The second section presents the 
problems and parameters of interest in impact evaluation. The third section discusses the method of 
difference-in-differences with matching in the case of a single binary program. The fourth section 
extends the method to the case of multiple overlapping programs. Next, the fifth section presents 
the application of the method in measuring impacts of formal and informal credit in Vietnam. 
Finally the sixth section concludes.  
 
2. Evaluation of Program Impact: Problems and Parameter of Interest 
 
The main objective of impact evaluation of a program is to assess the extent to which the 
program has changed outcomes of subjects. In other words, impact of the program on participants is 
measured by the change in welfare outcome that is attributed only to the program. In literature of 
impact evaluation, a broader term “treatment” instead of program/project is sometimes used to refer 
an intervention whose impact is evaluated.  
To make the definition of impact evaluation more explicit, suppose that there is a program 
assigned to some people in population P. For simplicity, let’s assume there is a single program, and 
denote D as a binary variable of participation in the program of a person, i.e. D equals 1 if she/he 
participates in the program, and D equals 0 otherwise. Let Y denote the observed value of an 
interested outcome. This variable can receive two potential values depending on the binary values 
of the participation variable, i.e.  is the outcome in status of the program, and is the 1YY = 0YY =
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outcome in the status of no-program. Certainly, the potential outcomes are considered at a point of 
time after the program is implemented.   
The impact of the program on the outcome of a person i is measured by the following 
difference: 
01 iii YY −=∆           (2.1) 
It is equal to the difference between the outcome of the person when she/he participates in the 
program and the potential outcome of that person when she/he does not participate in the program. 
The problem is that we cannot observe both terms in equation (2.1) for one person. For those who 
participated in the program, we can observe Y1, but we cannot observe Y0 – the outcome if they 
would had not participated in the program. Similarly, we can observe Y0, but not Y1 for those who 
did not participate in the program. In this context, outcomes that we cannot observe are called 
counterfactual.   
It is wide consent that it is almost impossible to estimate program impact for each person 
(Heckman et. al., 1999). In fact, program impact can be estimated for a group of subjects. The most 
popular parameter of the program impact is Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 
(Heckman et. al., 1999), which is the expected impact of the program on the actual participants:  
)1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT      (2.2) 
More generally, we can allow these effects to vary across a vector of the observed variables X:  
( ) )1,|()1,|()1,|( 01 =−===∆= DXYEDXYEDXEATT X        (2.3) 
Another parameter which is also widely mentioned in impact evaluation is Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE). This parameter measures impact of the program on randomly selection 
people. ATE is defined as:2  
)()( 01 YEYEATT −=          (2.4) 
In this paper, we focus on ATT since this is the most popular parameter in impact 
evaluation. The estimation strategy of ATE is very similar. In the following discussion we will 
focus more on identification of the conditional parameters, since once the conditional parameters 
are identified, the unconditional parameters are also identified:  
        )1|dF(X 
1| 1)(1∫ = == dX X dATTATT        (2.5) 
Estimation of ATT(X) is not straightforward, since )1,|( 0 =DXYE  are not observed and cannot be 
estimated directly.  is called counterfactual which is the expected outcome of non-
participants if they would had participated in the program.  
)1,|( 0 =DXYE
 
3. Impact Estimation of a Program using Difference-in-Difference with Matching  
 
                                                     
2 There are other parameters such as local average treatment effect, marginal treatment effect, or even average 
effect of “non-treatment on non-treated” which measures what impact the program would have on the non-
participants if they had participated in the program, etc. 
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3.1. Matching Method  
 
There is a large amount of literature on matching methods of impact evaluation. Important 
contributions in this area can be found in studies such as Rubin (1977, 1979, 1980), Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983, 1985a), and Heckman, et al. (1997). The matching method can be used to estimate 
ATT under the conditional independence assumption. Formally, this assumption is written as:3 
Assumption 3.1: XDY ⊥0         (A.3.1) 
Actually, we just need a weaker form of (A.3.1) in order to identify the program impact parameter.   
Assumption 3.2:        (A.3.2) )X|Y(E)D,X|Y(E 00 =
This is called the conditional mean independence assumption. It is weaker than (A.4.1) in sense that 
(A.3.1) implies (A.3.2) but the reverse is not correct.  
The basic idea of the matching method is to find a control group (also called comparison 
group) that has the same (or at least similar) distribution of X as the treatment group. By doing so, 
we have controlled for the differences in X between the participants and non-participants. The 
potential outcomes of the control and treatment group are now independent of the program 
selection. The difference in outcome of the control group and the treatment group then can be 
attributed to the program impact.  
However for the matching method to be implemented, we must find a control group that is 
similar to the treatment group but does not participate in the program. This similarity assumption is 
called common support. If we denote as the probability of participating in the program for 
each subject, i.e. , the assumption can be stated formally as follows:  
)(Xp
)|1()( XDPXp ==
Assumption 3.3:          (A.3.3) 10 << )X(p
Proposition 3.1: Under assumptions (A.3.2) and (A.3.3), ATT(X) and ATT are identified by the 
matching method. 
Proof: the proof is straightforward using the conditional independence assumption. 
)0,|()1,|()1,|()1,|( 0101)( =−===−== DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYEATT X  .  (3.1) 
Both terms in (3.1) can be observed. In addition, assumption (A.3.3) ensures that there are some 
participants and non-participants whose values of X are the similar so that we are able to use sample 
information to estimate (3.1).  ATT is also identified as in (2.5).■  
The difficulty in the matching method is to how find matched non-participants for the 
participants when there are many variables X. A popular solution is proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) who show that if the potential outcomes are independent of the program assignment 
given by the variables X, then they are also independent of the program assignment given the 
balance score.4 
                                                     
3 If we want to estimate both ATT and ATE, we need the conditional independence assumption for both Y0 
and Y1, i.e., XDYY ⊥10 , .  
4 Other matching methods are subclassification (Cochran and Chambers, 1965) and (Cochran, 1968), and 
covariate matching (Rubin, 1979, 1980).  
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Proposition 3.2 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983):  
)X(bD)Y,Y(XDY,Y ⊥⇒⊥ 1010  
where  is any function such that )X(b [ ])X(bf)X(p =  and )X|D(E)X|DPr()X(p === 1 . 
A natural choice of the balance score is the propensity score, i.e., the probability of being assigned 
to the program. Using this proposition, is rewritten as: )X(ATT
)0),(|()1),(|( 01)( =−== DXpYEDXpYEATT X .     (3.2) 
Thus non-participants are matched with the participants based on the propensity score. Once the 
comparison is constructed, the parameters of program impact can be estimated by comparing the 
outcome of the comparison and treatment groups.  
 The matching method which relies on assumption (A.3.1) or (A.3.2) will lead to biased 
estimation of the program impacts if the program selection is based on not only observed but also 
unobserved variables. For example, people can participate in a micro-credit program because they 
have higher motivation for high income or better business and production skills. If these variables 
are not observed and controlled, the matching method will produce biased estimators of the 
program impacts.   
 
3.2. Difference-in-Difference with Matching 
 
When panel data on the participants and non-participants in a program before and after the 
program implementation are available, we can estimate the program impacts using the method of 
difference-in-differences with matching. This method allows the program selection to be based on 
unobserved variables. However it requires these unobserved variables time-invariant.  
Let’s denote  as the outcome and conditioning variables before the program. After 
the program, the potential outcomes are denoted as corresponding to the states of no-
program and program, and the conditioning variables are denoted as . The identification 
assumptions of the difference-in-differences with matching method are as follows. 
BB XY ,0
AA YY 10 ,
BX
Assumption 3.4: Conditional on X, the difference in the expectation of outcomes between the 
participants and non-participants are unchanged before and after the program, i.e.:   
)0,,|()1,,|()0,,|()1,,|( 0000 =−===−= DXXYEDXXYEDXXYEDXXYE ABAABAABBABB  
           (A.3.4) 
Assumption 3.5: 1),|1()|1(0 <===< AB XXDPXDP      (A.3.5)  
Assumption (A.3.5) is the common support assumption which means that there are non-participants 
who have variables XB and XA similar to those of the participants in the program.     
Proposition 3.3: Under assumptions (A.3.4) and (A.3.5), ATT(X) and ATT are identified by the 
difference-in-differences with matching method.  
Proof: 
Recall the parameter ATT(X) is equal to: 
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1)D ,X,X|E(Y - 1)D ,X,X|E(Y  ATTATT AB0AAB1A)X,(X(X) AB ====    (3.3) 
Insert equation in (A.3.4) into (3.3) to obtain: 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] [ )0,|()1,|()0,|(
)1,|()1,|(
)0,|()0,|(
000
00
00
=−====
=−=+
=
]
−====
DXYEDXYE-DXYE-1)D X,|E(Y                   
DXYEDXYE                       
DXYEDXYE -1)D X,|E(Y - 1)D X,|E(Y  ATT
BBA1A
BA
BA0A1A)X,(X AB
  
The unconditional parameter is also identified by (2.5).■ 
According to the method, the non-participants are matched with the participants based on 
their variables X before and after the program. The matched non-participants will form a 
comparison groups.  
Note that the term [ ])0,,|()1,,|( 00 =−= DXXYEDXXYE ABAABA  in (A.3.4) is set equal to 
zero if we want to identify the program impacts using single cross-section data. This bias arises 
when the conditional expectation of outcome of non-participants is used to predict the conditional 
expectation of outcome of participants if they had not participated in the program. Matching method 
using single cross-section data assumes this bias equals zero once conditional on X. Thus the panel 
data matching method is more robust than the matching method in sense that it allows this bias to 
differ from zero. It, however, requires that this bias be time-invariant. 
 
4. Difference-in-Difference with Matching in Multiple Overlapping Programs 
 
4.1. The Case of Two Overlapping Programs 
 
For illustration of the ideas, this section discusses impact evaluation of two programs. In the 
next section, the method will be extended to the case of multiple programs. 
Suppose that there are two programs that are assigned to some people in population P.  
Denote D as a vector variable of program participation of a person. D has two binary variable 
elements: d1 and d2, i.e.: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
2
1
d
d
D  
where  if the person receives the program 1, and 11 =d 01 =d  otherwise; similarly  if the 
person receives the program 1, and 
12 =d
02 =d  otherwise. As a result, the set of the potential treatment 
have 4 values: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=Ω
0
0
;
1
0
;
0
1
;
1
1
   D   
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Further let YB denote the value of an interested outcome before the program implementation. After 
the program, the potential outcome set is { }00011011 ;;; YYYYPY =Ω 5, corresponding to the values of the 
participation variable. 
Suppose we are interested in program impact of the program d1 measured by ATT. The 
identification of the program d2 is the same. Denote Y1 as the potential outcome of a person when 
she/he participates in the program d1 (d1 = 1), and Y0 as the potential outcome when she/he does not 
participate in the program (d1 = 0). ATT for the program d1 is defined as: 
)1,()1,,(1 101101)( =−==−= dXYYEdXXYYEATT ABX     (4.1)6 
To express this parameter in terms of the four potential outcomes, we rearrange (4.1):  
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]      dXdddXYEddXYE                 
 dXdddXYEddXYE              
dXdddXYEdXdddXYE -               
dXdddXYEdXdddXYE              
dXYEdXYEATT X
)1,|0Pr()0,1,|()0,1,|(
)1,|1Pr()1,1,|()1,1,|(
)1,|0Pr()0,1,|()1,|1Pr()1,1,|(
)1,|0Pr()0,1,|()1,|1Pr()1,1,|(
)1,|()1,|(1
1221002110
1221012111
122100122101
122110122111
1011)(
====−==+
====−===
====+====
====+=====
=−==
           (4.2) 
The above formula allows for the overlap between the program d1 and the program d2. If the two 
programs are mutually exclusive, then the term )1,|1Pr( 12 == dXd will be equal to zero, and the 
term )1,|0Pr( 12 == dXd is equal to 1. In this case the implementation of the matching method is 
similar to the case of a single binary program, taking into account that the comparison group should 
exclude those who participate in the program d2.    
Similar to the case of a single program, to identify ATT using the matching method we 
require that the difference in the expectation of potential outcomes between the participants and 
non-participants are the same before and after the program given the variables X and d2: 
Assumption 4.1: 
    )1,0,|()1,1,|()1,0,|()1,1,|( 21012101210210 ==−=====−== ddXYEddXYEddXYEddXYE BB  
    )0,0,|()0,1,|()0,0,|()0,1,|( 21002100210210 ==−=====−== ddXYEddXYEddXYEddXYE BB
           (A.4.1) 
To estimate the program impact by matching, it is required that there be remaining people 
who do not participate in the program d1 but have similar distribution of the variables X given the 
treatment variable d2. This is the common support assumption, and is stated formally as follows: 
Assumption 4.2:   1)0,|1(0 21 <==< dXdP  
1)1,|1(0 21 <==< dXdP      (A.4.2) 
Proposition 4.1: Under assumptions (A.4.1) and (A.4.2), the conditional and unconditional 
parameters ATT(X) and ATT for the program d1 are identified. 
Proof:  
                                                     
5 For simplicity, the subscript “A” is dropped.  
6 For simplicity in denotation, we denote variables { }AB XX ,  as X. 
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Similar to the proof of the proposition 3.3, substitute two equations in (A.4.1) to (4.2) to identify 
ATT1(X): 
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]      )1,|0Pr()0,1,|()0,1,|(
)0,1,|()0,1,|(
                
 )1,|1Pr(
)1,0,|()1,1,|(
)1,0,|()1,1,|(
             
)1,,|()1,,|(1
12
210210
21102110
12
210210
21012111
1011)(
==
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
==−==−
==−==+
==
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
==−==−
==−===
=−==
dXd
ddXYEddXYE
ddXYEddXYE
dXd
ddXYEddXYE
ddXYEddXYE
dXXYEdXXYEATT
BB
BB
ABABX
 (4.3) 
The unconditional parameter, ATT is identified because of (2.5).■  
To estimate the program impacts, the non-participants in the program d1 will be matched to 
the participants in the program d1 based on the closeness of the distance between the variables to 
construct the comparison group. The matching is performed for people who have the same program 
variable d2, i.e. the participants and matched non-participants have the same participation statuses in 
the program d2.  
For a participant i, denote nic as the number of non-participants j who are matched with this 
participant, and w(i,j) is weight is attached to the outcome of each non-participant. These weights 
are defined non-negative and sum up to 1, i.e.: 
1),(
1
=∑
=
icn
j
jiw           (4.4) 
Weight can be equal weights, e.g. as in n-nearest neighbor matching or different weights e.g. kernel 
matching and local linear regression matching.   
For those who do not participate in the program d2 (i.e. d2 = 0), the difference in outcome 
between the participants and matched non-participants is given by:  
∑ ∑
== ==
== ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −=
xXd
n
j
BjBi
n
j
AjAi
x
dxX
i
icic
YjiwYYjiwY
n
TTA
,0 1
01
1
01
1
)0,(
2
2
),(),(11ˆ ∑   (4.5) 
Where: 
? nX1 is the number of those who have xXdd === ;0;1 21 . 
? Yi1A and Yj0A are the observed outcomes of participant i and non-participant j with X = x after the 
program.  
? Yi1B and Yj0B are the observed outcomes of participant i and non-participant j with X = x before 
the program. 
Similarly, we have the estimator , and the estimator is: )1,( 2
ˆ == dxXTTA )(ˆ xXTTA =
{ })1,(2)0,(1
21
)( 22 1
ˆ1ˆ11ˆ ===== ++= dxXxdxXxxxxX
TTAnTTAn
nn
TTA     (4.6) 
where: 
? nX2 is the number of those who have xXdd === ;1;1 21  
The estimators of unconditional parameter are: 
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{ } ∑∑ ∈ =∈== XSx xXX TTASxdITTA )(1 1ˆ;1
11ˆ                (4.7) 
Where I{} is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the value of {} is true, 0 otherwise, SX is 
sample space of the X variables.  
 
4.2. The Case of Multiple Overlapping Programs 
 
Now suppose that there are m programs that are assigned to subjects in population P. Denote 
participation in the programs by a vector variable D: 
( md,...,d,dD 21= )
)
 .          (4.8) 
where  is a variable that equals 1 if she participates in program k, and 0 otherwise. Subjects who 
do not participate in any program will have the value of the vector D equal to . In 
contrast, subjects who participate in all the programs will have the value of the vector D equal 
to . The set of the potential treatments has 2m values: 
kd
( )000 ,...,,D =
( 111 ,...,,D =
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=Ω
1
.
.
1
1
;;.
0
.
.
0
1
;
0
.
.
0
0
  ...  D .          (4.9) 
Before the program implementation, the outcome variable is observed and denoted by Y0B. After 
program implementation, corresponding to each value of the vector variable D, there is a potential 
outcome, denoted by .7 Thus for each subject, there are 2m potential outcomes. However we are 
able to observe only one outcome of those, depending on the realization of the vector variable D.  
P
)D(Y
In general, one can estimate impact of a treatment state gDD = relative to a treatment state 
: hDD =
)DD,X|Y(E)DD,X|Y(EATTgh g
P
DDg
P
DD)X( hg =−== == .    (4.10) 
However, explanation of (4.10) is complicated and less practical. For simplicity, we focus on 
impact of a particular program, e.g., program . The impact parameter of program k is defined: kd
).1,|()1,|( 01)( =−== == kPdkPdX dXYEdXYEATTk kk       (4.11)  
It should be noted that in (4.10) and (4.11) the X variable denotes variables { }AB XX ,  for simplicity 
in formulas. The identification assumptions for the difference-in-differences with matching method 
in the case of multiple overlapping programs are extended as follows: 
Assumption 4.3: 
                                                     
7 For simplicity, the subscript “A” is dropped.  
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    ),0,,|()1,,|()0,,|()1,,|( 0,0,00 =−===−= == kdDkdDkBkB dDXYEdDXYEdDXYEdDXYE kk  
where kdDD \=  i.e. D  does not include .      (A.4.3) kd
The matching method requires the assumption on common: 
Assumption 4.4:   1),|1(0 <=< DXdP k .      (A.4.4) 
),|1( DXdP k =  is the conditional probability of participating in program dk given the variables X 
and other program variables. It is required that there be still subjects who do not participate in 
program dk but have the same variables X and participation statuses of the other programs (not 
include program dk) as those of the participants of program dk.  
Proposition 4.2: Under the assumptions (A.4.3) and (A.4.4),  and for program  
are identified by the difference-in-differences with matching method. 
)X(ATTk ATTk kd
Proof:  
Similar to (4.3), the  is written as follows:  )X(ATTk
[ ]{ },)1,|Pr()1,,|()1,,|( )1,|()1,|( 0,1,
01)(
∑
Ω∈
==
==
==−==
=−==
Dg
kk
kk
D
kkdDkdD
kdkdX
dXDdDXYEdDXYE
dXYEdXYEATTk
  (4.12) 
There are unobserved terms in (4.12) i.e., )1,,|( 0, == kdD dDXYE k . However, under assumptions 
(A.4.3) and (A.4.4), we have: 
[ ]
[ ] ,)1,|Pr()0,,|()1,,|(
)0,,|()1,,|(
)1,|()1,|(
00
0,1,
01)(
∑
Ω∈
==
==
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ =⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=−=−
=−==
=−==
D
kk
kk
D
k
kBkB
kdDkdD
kdkdX
dXD
dDXYEdDXYE
dDXYEdDXYE
dXYEdXYEATTk
 
This parameter is identified since all the terms are observed. The unconditional parameters are also 
identified by formulas (2.5).■  
To estimate the program impacts, the participants of program  will be matched to the non-
participants based on the closeness of the distance in the variables X before and after the program 
implementation. In addition, the matching is performed for people who have the same program 
statuses D (except program ). The estimator of the  has a similar form as in the case of 
two programs, i.e., formula (4.6), in which the sample mean outcomes of the participants are 
estimators of 
kd
kd )X(ATTk
)0,,|( 1, == kdD dDXYE k , and the sample mean outcomes of the matched non-
participants are estimators of )1,,|( 0, == kdD dDXYE k  (before and after the program).  
 
4.3. Matching Using the Propensity Scores 
 
To perform the matching using propensity scores, Proposition 3.2 is extended to the case of 
multiple overlapping programs as follows:  
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Proposition 3.5: )X(b|DYXDY P )D(
P
)D( ⊥⇒⊥ , 
where  is any function such that ( )Xb ( ) ( )[ ]XbfX|DP = .  
Since we focus on impact of a program of interest, e.g., program k , we will state the proposition 
in a different way which emphasizes a program of interest. 
 d
   
Proposition 3.6: )D,X(bdYD,XdY kk
P
)D(k
P
)D( ⊥⇒⊥ , 
where: 
kd\DD =  i.e. D  does not include , kd
( ) ( )D,X|dED,X|dP kk ==1 , 
( D,Xbk ) is any function such that ( ) ( )[ ]D,XbfD,X|dP kk == 1 . 
Proof:  
It is equivalent to show that (Dawid, 1979): 
( )[ ] ( )[ D,Xb|dPD,Xb,Y|dP kkkP )D(k 11 === ].      (4.13) 
The following manipulations using law of iterated expectation:   
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{ }
{ }
{ }
)].D,X(b|d[P                                         
)D,X(b)D,X|d(PE                                         
)D,X(b]D,X|d[EE                                         
)D,X(b]D,X,Y|d[EE                                         
)D,X(b,Y)]D,X(b,D,X,Y|d[EE                                         
)]D,X(b,Y|d[E)]D,X(b,Y|d[P
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kk
k
P
)D(k
k
P
)D(k
P
)D(k
k
P
)D(kk
P
)D(k
1
1
1
==
==
=
=
=
==
  (4.14) 
The propensity score is usually selected as the balancing score. The above two propositions 
3.5 and 3.6 suggest two ways to estimate the propensity score. The first is to estimate propensity 
score for the treatment variable D , i.e.  by a multinomial model. The second is to 
estimate the propensity score for the program  conditional on the variables X and 
)X|D(P
kd D . If we are 
interested in a particular program, it is more convenient and easy to estimate the probability of 
participation in the program given the variables X and D .  
 
5. Impact of Formal and Informal Credit in Vietnam 
 
 This section illustrates the impact estimation of the borrowing from formal and informal 
credit in Vietnam. Some households can borrow from both the formal and informal credit sources. 
Thus the borrowing from the formal and informal credit sources can be regarded as two overlapping 
programs, and the method of difference-in-differences with matching can be applied to measure 
impact of the borrowing.  
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 5.1. Data Source 
 
The study relies on data from the two Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS) to analyze the poverty targeting and impact of the formal and informal credit in Vietnam. 
The surveys were conducted by the General Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical 
support from World Bank in the years 2002 and 2004. Information on household characteristics is 
collected using detailed household questionnaires. The collected information includes basic 
demography, employment and labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, 
housing, fixed assets and durable goods, the participation of households in poverty alleviation 
programs, and especially information on credit that households had borrowed during the past 12 
months before the year 2004.    
The 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs sampled 29530 and 9188, respectively. The samples are 
representative for the whole country and 8 geographic regions. It is very interesting that these 
samples of VHLSS 2002 and 2004 construct a panel data set of 4008 households, which is 
representative for the whole country, and regions of large population.  
 
5.2. Formal and informal credit in Vietnam 
 
It is often argued that micro-credit is an important tool for smoothing consumption and 
promoting production, especially for the poor households (e.g. Zeller, et. al. 1997; Conning and 
Udry, 2005).       In Vietnam there are alternative sources of credit that a household can borrow 
from. Among the formal credit institution, the Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(BARD) is the largest lender. The Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) is a State bank which 
is targeted at the poor households. For the informal credit sources, friends and relatives are 
important lenders for the households in Vietnam. 
Table 1: Households borrowing from formal and informal credit sources 
  
Households not 
borrowing from 
informal credit 
sources 
Households 
borrowing 
from informal 
credit sources 
Total by 
column 
% 60.3 14.6 74.9 Households not borrowing 
from formal credit sources No. obs. 2416 585 3001 
% 20.7 4.4 25.1 Households borrowing 
from formal credit sources No. obs. 831 176 1007 
% 81.0 19.0 100 
Total by row 
No. obs. 3247 761 4008 
Note: the percentages are estimated using the sampling weights of the 2004 VHLSS. 
Source: Estimation from the 2004 VHLSS. 
 
 Table 1 shows that 25% and 19% of households borrow from the formal and informal credit 
sources, respectively. About 4.4% of households can have access and borrow from both the formal 
and informal credit sources.  
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 It should be noted that panel data from the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs are used in the difference-
in-differences with matching method. Data from the 2002 VHLSS are considered as baseline data. 
Thus only loans which were obtained by households between 2002 and 2004 are included in Table 
1.    
 
5.3. Impact Estimation of Formal and Informal Credit 
 
The first step in the measuring impact is to predict the probability of receiving credit 
between the year 2002 and 2004 for all households in the sample. Since the dependent variable is 
binary, a logit regression is often used. The main problem in the estimation is how to select 
explanatory variables. All variables that are exogenous to the credit borrowing and expected to 
affect the credit borrowing as well as outcomes should be included in the model. Variables pre-
program are clearly unaffected by the program implementation. Conditioning variables used 
include: the regional variables; household demography such as household size, percentage of the 
elderly and children; education and main job of the head; ratio of working people in 2002; saving, 
foreign and domestic remittances and household asset in 2002. Variables of the number of sick days 
and sick persons in 2002 and 2004 are also included, since a part of credit is used for healthcare 
treatment.  
It should be noted that the usage of the predicted propensity score is mainly aimed to 
overcome the multidimensionality problem of matching by covariates. The quality of a constructed 
comparison group should be assessed by testing whether the distribution of characteristics 
covariates is similar between the comparison and treatment groups given the predicted propensity 
score. In this research two types of test are performed to examine the similarity of covariates 
between the matched non-participants and participants. The first is simply the test for the mean 
equality of covariates between the treatment and comparison groups. The second is the test for the 
mean equality of covariates within strata of the predicted propensity score.8 If there exists a 
covariate not balanced in many strata, e.g. three strata, the comparison group should be 
reconstructed by modifying the logit model of propensity score.9 Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix graph 
the propensity score for the recipients and non-recipients of formal and informal credit.       
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimation of the program impact measured by the parameter 
ATT. Three matching schemes are used, namely the 1 nearest-neighbor, 3 nearest-neighbors, and 
kernel matching with bandwidth equal to 0.01. The standard errors are estimated using 
nonparametric bootstrap with 500 replications.  
Table 2: Impact of Formal Credit 
Outcome variables (thousand VND) Matching schemes 
Expenditure 
per capita 
Household 
fixed assets 
Household 
durables 
Income per 
capita 
1 nearest neighbor 224.7 9833.9** 574.2* 297.1 
                                                     
8 The method of testing the equality in mean of covariates within stratum is proposed by Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002). They perform the test for all the participants and non-participants after estimating the propensity 
score. In this research the test is applied for the treatment and comparison groups after they are matched. 
Since what we need is the similarity of covariates between the treatment and comparison groups. 
9 The logit regression results are not presented in this paper, but they can be provided on request. 
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matching (165.9) (4902.6) (300.6) (574.8) 
189.0 6100.2** 393.8* 350.1 3 nearest neighbors 
matching (143.6) (3094.4) (254.3) (458.9) 
129.5 5968.7** 430.9* 340.3 Kernel matching with 
bandwidth of 0.01 (113.5) (3047.8) (229.4) (357.1) 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications (in parentheses).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Estimation from the 2002-2004 VHLSSs 
 
 
Table 2 shows that the formal credit has positive impact on fixed assets and durable assets 
of the borrowing households. The results are similar between the three matching scheme. However, 
the impacts on expenditure and income per capita are not statistically significant. This can be 
because the period 2002-2004 is quite short, and the effect of credit on income and expenditure is 
not clear.   
Table 3 presents impact of informal credit on household welfare. It shows that informal 
credit does not have any statistically significant estimate of ATT on all the household outcomes.  
 
Table 3: Impact of Informal Credit 
Outcome variables (thousand VND) Matching schemes 
Expenditure 
per capita 
Household 
fixed assets 
Household 
durables 
Income per 
capita 
208.5 7533.1 389.2 388.2 1 nearest neighbor 
matching (180.8) (4979.9) (415.6) (456.1) 
157.5 4449.7 29.8 309.3 3 nearest neighbors 
matching (156.1) (4260.8) (404.6) (366.8) 
116.8 3250.5 40.7 335.6 Kernel matching with 
bandwidth of 0.01 (144.1) (3999.5) (389.7) (308.2) 
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications (in parentheses).  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Estimation from the 2002-2004 VHLSSs 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Traditional literature on program impact evaluation often deals with a single binary program. 
In reality, some people can join several programs at the same time. This paper discusses the 
difference-in-differences with matching method in a general context in which people may 
participate in several programs simultaneously. The parameter of interest is the Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated (ATT). It is shown that impact of a program can be measured as a weighted 
average of impacts of the program on groups with various program statuses, which are estimated by 
the difference-in-differences with matching method.  
The method is illustrated by measuring impacts of formal and informal credit in Vietnam. 
The panel data used for the impact estimate are from two Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys in 2002 and 2004. It is shown that formal credit has positive and statistically significant 
impact estimate on the fixed and durables assets of the borrowing households. However, there is no 
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impact of formal credit found on income and consumption expenditure of the borrowing 
households. For the informal credit, the impact estimates are not statistically significant for all the 
four outcomes of interest. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Density of propensity score for recipients and non-recipients of formal credit 
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Figure 2: Density of propensity score for recipients and non-recipients of formal credit 
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